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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 09-4722 
 ___________ 
 
 ALEX DANIEL RUIZ-DE LA CRUZ, 
         Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
     Respondent 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A088-742-107) 
 Immigration Judge: Honorable Henry Dogin 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 6, 2011 
 Before:  SCIRICA, FISHER and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Filed: April 12, 2011) 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 Alex Ruiz-De La Cruz (“Ruiz”) petitions for review of a final order entered by the 
Board of Immigration Appelas (“BIA”), which dismissed his appeal of an immigration 
judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his application for cancellation of removal.  For the following 
reasons, we will grant the Government’s motion to dismiss the petition for lack of 
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jurisdiction. 
 Ruiz is a native and citizen of Guatemala.  He entered the United States in 1995 as 
a lawful nonimmigrant visitor.  He overstayed his visa and, in February 2008, the 
Government instituted removal proceedings against him.  He conceded removability, but 
requested cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1), alleging that his removal 
would result in an exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his three-year old son.  
At an October 2008 hearing, Ruiz testified that he lives with his wife, who is a citizen of 
Panama in the United States illegally, and his son, who is a United States citizen.  At the 
time of the hearing, his wife was pregnant with the couple’s second child.  Ruiz testified 
that both he and his wife worked, but that he provided most of the financial support for 
the household.  He also provides financial support to his two children—one also a United 
States citizen—living in Guatemala with their mother.  He further stated that removal to 
Guatemala would result in his separation from his wife, son, and unborn child.  Finally, 
he testified that he would make less money in Guatemala and thus would be unable to 
continue to financially support his children. 
The IJ considered the family’s circumstances but found that Ruiz’s removal, while 
creating an economic hardship, would not constitute exceptional and extremely unusual 
hardship to the three-year old son.
1
  The IJ denied Ruiz’s application for cancellation of 
removal and granted his alternative request for voluntary departure.  The BIA agreed with 
                                                 
1
 The IJ also found that Ruiz’s removal would not constitute a hardship to his older 
daughter, the United States citizen who is living in Guatemala with her mother.  Ruiz 
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the IJ, finding that Ruiz had failed to meet his burden of establishing that the hardship for 
his son rises to the level of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.  Ruiz filed a 
timely petition for review. 
While we ordinarily have jurisdiction to review a final order of removal under 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), Congress has also provided that “no court shall have jurisdiction to 
review [. . .] any other decision or action of the Attorney General the authority for which 
is specified under this subchapter [8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1378] to be in the discretion of the 
Attorney General.”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B).  While we retain jurisdiction to review 
constitutional claims and questions of law raised in a petition for review, Sukwanputra v. 
Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627, 634 (3d Cir. 2006); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), this jurisdiction is 
“narrowly circumscribed,” Jarbough v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 483 F.3d 184, 
188 (3d Cir. 2007).  
The Attorney General (through the BIA and the IJ) may grant cancellation of 
removal to an alien who, inter alia, “establishes that removal would result in exceptional 
and extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of 
the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.”  8 U.S.C. § 
1229b(b)(1)(D).  We have held that the decision whether an alien has established an 
“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” is a discretionary decision not subject to 
judicial review.  Mendez-Moranchel v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 176, 179 (3d Cir. 2003).  
Thus, we may not disturb the BIA’s decision affirming the IJ’s finding that Ruiz did not 
                                                                                                                                                             
does not challenge this finding. 
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make the required showing for cancellation of removal under § 1229b(b)(1). 
Here, the sole issue raised in Ruiz’s brief is “whether the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) 
erred in denying petitioner’s eligibility for cancellation of removal under the standards 
enunciated by the Board of Immigration Appeals in this case.”  Although he couches his 
argument in constitutional terms by alleging that the three-year old son’s due process 
rights would be violated if Ruiz were removed, his argument is essentially a claim that 
the IJ erred in its consideration of Ruiz’s hardship factors.  This is precisely the kind of 
claim for which we lack jurisdiction.  “A party cannot confer jurisdiction on this Court 
where none exists simply by attaching a particular label to the claim raised in a petition 
for review.”  Cospito v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 539 F.3d 166, 170 (3d Cir. 
2008). 
Accordingly, we grant the Government’s motion and will dismiss the petition for 
review for lack of jurisdiction. 
